Despite its successes, to date Artificial Intelligence (AI) is still characterized by a number of shortcomings with regards to different application domains and goals. These limitations are arguably both conceptual (e.g., related to the underlying theoretical models, such as symbolic vs.connectionist), and operational (e.g., related to robustness and ability to generalize). Biologically inspired AI, and more specifically brain-inspired AI, promises to provide further biological aspects beyond those that are already traditionally included in AI, making it possible to assess and possibly (...) overcome some of its present shortcomings. This article examines some conceptual, technical, and ethical issues raised by the development and use of brain-inspired AI. Against this background, the paper asks whether there is anything ethically unique about brain-inspired AI. The aim of the paper is to introduce a method that has a heuristic nature and that can be applied to identify and address the ethical issues arising from brain-inspired AI (and from AI more generally). The conclusion resulting from the application of this method is that, compared to traditional AI, brain-inspired AI raises new foundational ethical issues and some new practical ethical issues, and exacerbates some of the issues raised by traditional AI. (shrink)

This volume examines the problems of legal and linguistic diversity in the EU legal system. In a union of 27 member states, with 23 different languages, how can the coherence of EU law be guaranteed? Is there a common understanding between lawyers from different national backgrounds as to the meaning and domestic application of EU law? The volume addresses these central questions from a range of theoretical and practical perspectives.

Van Gelder presents the distinction between dynamical systems and digital computers as the core issue of current developments in cognitive science. We think this distinction is much less important than a reassessment of cognition as a neurally, bodily, and environmentally embedded process. Embedded cognition lines up naturally with dynamical models, but it would also stand if combined with classic computation.

The belief that conscious will is merely "an illusion created by the brain" appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial 'Libet-experiments', as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity (...) causes conscious will. We show that the illusion-claim is based on the behaviorist 'input-output' paradigm, and discuss the notions of 'self-organization' and 'self-steering' to provide an alternative perspective on the causal efficacy of conscious will. In the final sections, a tentative theoretical picture is sketched of conscious will as an instance of self-steered self-organization. We conclude that the subjective experience of conscious will is not a misguided one, but rather that the mechanisms supporting conscious will are considerably more complex than mainstream cognitive neuroscience currently acknowledges. (shrink)

This book offers a fundamentally new account of the arguments and concepts which define Heidegger's early philosophy, and locates them in relation to both contemporary analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy. Drawing on recent work in the philosophy of mind and on Heidegger's lectures on Plato and Kant, Sacha Golob argues against existing treatments of Heidegger on intentionality and suggests that Heidegger endorses a unique position with respect to conceptual and representational content; he also examines the implications of (...) this for Heidegger's views on truth, realism and 'being'. He goes on to explore Heidegger's work on the underlying issue of normativity, and focuses on his theory of freedom, arguing that it is freedom that links the existential concerns of Being and Time to concepts such as reason, perfection and obligation. His book offers a distinctive new perspective for students of Heidegger and the history of twentieth-century philosophy. (shrink)

This paper examines Heidegger’s position on a foundational distinction for Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy: that between acting ‘in the light of’ a norm and acting ‘merely in accordance with it’. In section 1, I introduce the distinction and highlight several relevant similarities between Kant and Heidegger on ontology and the first-person perspective. In section 2, I press the Kantian position further, focusing on the role of inferential commitments in perception: this provides a foil against which Heidegger’s account can be In (...) section 3, I contrast this Kantian approach with Crowell’s highly sophisticated reading of Heidegger on care: I argue that, subject to certain conditions on how we view explanation, the two approaches are compatible and indeed mutually supporting. I close in section 4 by addressing an importantly distinct dimension of normativity, that marked by critique, broadly construed. I argue that we ultimately need to locate Heidegger in a context that. (shrink)

In our digital world, we are confused by privacy – what is public, what is private? We are also challenged by it, the conditions of privacy so uncertain we become unsure about our rights to it. We may choose to share personal information, but often do so on the assumption that it won't be re-shared, sold, or passed on to other parties without our knowing. In the eighteenth century, philosopher Jeremy Bentham wrote about a new model for a prison called (...) a Panopticon, where inmates surrounded the jailers, always under watch. Have we built ourselves a digital Panopticon? Are we the guards or the prisoners, captive or free? Can we be both? When Kim Kardashian makes the minutiae of her life available online, which is she? With great rigour, this important book draws on a Kantian philosophy of ethics and legal frameworks to examine where we are and to suggest steps – conceptual and practical – to ensure the future is not dystopian. Privacy is one of the defining issues of our time; this lively book explains why this is so, and the ways in which we might protect it. (shrink)

`This is an exceptionally good textbook. It covers an unusually wide range of issues in an up-to-date and balanced fashion, and is clearly written. It would be invaluable for all students, both undergraduates and postgraduates, who take a genuine interest in the nature of psychology and the theoretical issues it faces' - Professor Graham Richards, Director, British Psychological Society History of Psychology Centre Psychology is understood by many as the `science of the mind', but what is `mind' and what have (...) modern psychology and philosophy to say about its nature? What is `science' and what is a scientific approach to mind? This thoroughly revised edition o the classic textbook explores a wide range of problems in psychology, philosophy, cognitive and brains sciences identifying the major topics, debates and controversies and presenting them in a balanced and accessible manner for students. Key features of this Second Edition include: } A new, ten chapter structure making it ideal for a lecture course; } Contains new content on advances in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, including neural networks, dynamics systems and situated cognition; } Final chapter focuses on `hot issues' at the interface of psychology and philosophy - making attempts to look forward. } Pedagogical features including chapter summaries and further readings. Brought fully up-to-date with advances in computational, cognitive and neuroscience work on the one hand, and links with philosophy on the other, this book is essential reading for all students needing an understanding of these issues. (shrink)

De Montesquieu à Posner, de Durkheim à Foucault, la recherche d'un schéma de causalité qui expliquerait synthétiquement les variations entre les systèmes historiques de pénalité sur une échelle unique d’observation est une entreprise ambitieuse à l'intersection de la sociologie du droit et d'une matière peu à peu décriée : la philosophie de l'Histoire. Aujourd'hui, deux corps théoriques complexes et éclatés prétendent au titre de sciences de l'évolution pénale. Le premier est fondé sur une analogie poussée entre évolution culturelle et évolution (...) biologique, et emprunte à l'analyse économique du droit ainsi qu’aux dernières révolutions des sciences naturelles. Le second trouve ses racines dans la pensée marxiste et perçoit le système pénal comme une machine d'oppression qui évolue au gré des passations de pouvoir. Ces deux courants semblent à première vue théoriser l’évolution pénale d’une façon satisfaisante. Mais en imprimant leur volonté normative sur des considérations descriptives, ces doctrines occultent certaines discontinuités historiques et en façonnent d'autres, nous forçant à voir des ruptures matérielles là où il n'y a que des changements d'intention. En voulant présenter une histoire cohérente et intelligible, elles ont délaissé les contradictions et les rouages manquants de l'évolution pénale, tout ce qui, dans cette histoire, ne ressemblait pas à une machine dont les Hommes contrôlent la direction. En rejetant ce paradigme, la forme de l'histoire pénale se métamorphose, sa chronologie se redéfinit, et l’évolution pénale présente des problématiques nouvelles telles la porosité des législations, la concurrence des normes dans la fonction d’exclusion, la persistance des châtiments physiques ou les superpositions identifiables entre histoire juridique, histoire technique et histoire sacrée. (shrink)

In the context of a history of the emotions, Martin Heidegger presents an important and yet challenging case. He is important because he places emotional states, broadly construed, at the very heart of his philosophical methodology—in particular, anxiety and boredom. He is challenging because he is openly dismissive of the standard ontologies of emotions, and because he is largely uninterested in many of the canonical debates in which emotions figure. My aim in this chapter is to identify and critique the (...) distinctive role which Heidegger allots to the emotions, focusing on Sein und Zeit's famous treatment of anxiety. Having outlined his position, I close by considering a number of challenges, both methodological and substantive, to Heidegger's approach. (shrink)

In our digital world, we are confused by privacy – what is public, what is private? We are also challenged by it, the conditions of privacy so uncertain we become unsure about our rights to it. We may choose to share personal information, but often do so on the assumption that it won't be re-shared, sold, or passed on to other parties without our knowing. In the eighteenth century, philosopher Jeremy Bentham wrote about a new model for a prison called (...) a Panopticon, where inmates surrounded the jailers, always under watch. Have we built ourselves a digital Panopticon? Are we the guards or the prisoners, captive or free? Can we be both? When Kim Kardashian makes the minutiae of her life available online, which is she? With great rigour, this important book draws on a Kantian philosophy of ethics and legal frameworks to examine where we are and to suggest steps – conceptual and practical – to ensure the future is not dystopian. Privacy is one of the defining issues of our time; this lively book explains why this is so, and the ways in which we might protect it. (shrink)

This article presents conceptual bridges that exist between the philosophy of G.W.F Hegel and a feminist ethics of care. To do so, it engages with Slavoj Žižek’s contemporary reading of Hegel in concert with existing feminist interpretations of Hegel’s thought. The goal of doing so is to demonstrate how both Žižek and a selection of critical feminist thinkers interpret Hegel’s perspective on the nature of subjectivity, intersubjective relations and the relationship between the subject and the world it inhabits, in a (...) way that can further our thinking on the feminist ethics of care as a relational and contextualist ethics that foregrounds vulnerability as a condition of existence. These readings of Hegel highlight the radical contingency of human subjectivity, as well as the relationship between human subjectivity and the external world, in a way that is compatible with the feminist ethics of care’s emphasis on the particularity, fluidity, and interdependency of human relationships. I argue that this confrontation between care ethics and mainstream philosophy is valuable because it offers mutual contributions to both care ethics as a moral and political theory and the philosophy of Hegel and Žižek. (shrink)

This article advances a new account of Kant’s views on conceptualism. On the one hand, I argue that Kant was a nonconceptualist. On the other hand, my approach accommodates many motivations underlying the conceptualist reading of his work: for example, it is fully compatible with the success of the Transcendental Deduction. I motivate my view by providing a new analysis of both Kant’s theory of perception and of the role of categorical synthesis: I look in particular at the categories of (...) quantity. Locating my interpretation in relation to recent research by Allais, Ginsborg, Tolley and others, I argue that it offers an attractive compromise on this important theoretical and exegetical issue. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a relationship between understandings of anorexia nervosa (AN) and how the ethical issues associated with involuntary treatment for AN are identified, framed, and addressed. By positioning AN as a construct/discourse (hereinafter “AN: the diagnosis”) several ethical issues are revealed. Firstly, “AN: the diagnosis” influences how the autonomy and competence of persons diagnosed with AN are understood by decision-makers in the treatment environment. Secondly, “AN: the diagnosis” impacts on how treatment and treatment efficacy are defined (...) and the ethical justifiability of paternalism. Thirdly, “AN: the diagnosis” can limit the opportunity for persons with AN to construct an identity that casts them as a competent person. “AN: the diagnosis” can thus inherently affirm professional knowledge and values. Postmodern professional ethics can support professionals in managing these issues by highlighting the importance of taking responsibility for professional knowledge, values, and power and embracing moral uncertainty. (shrink)

Este artículo trata de poner en claro el estatuto del �cartesianismo� de Richir en su tercera Meditación fenomenológica, en la cual Richir propone una nueva versión de la reducción fenomenológica. Mostraremos en primer lugar cómo Richir centra su lectura de Descartes sobre el carácter hiperbólico de la duda, descubriendo en él un momento propiamente fenomenológico. Examinaremos luego el modo en el que Richir ensaya un acercamiento del cogito cartesiano respecto de la concepción heideggeriana del ser-para-la-muerte. Por último, explicaremos cómo Richir (...) critica esta �vía cartesiana� (y, por ende, también heideggeriana) para elaborar su propia concepción de la facticidad. (shrink)

Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality; scientists, in terms of symmetry and invariance. In this book van Fraassen argues that no metaphysical account of laws can succeed. He analyzes and rejects the arguments that there are laws of nature, or that we must believe there are, and argues that we should disregard the idea of law as an adequate clue to science. After exploring what this means for general epistemology, the author develops the empiricist (...) view of science as a construction of models to represent the phenomena. (shrink)

The history of science is often understood as a succession of theories. However, this conception of the history of science does not do justice to the complexity of the dynamics implemented in scientific development. To illustrate this, we focus on a type of phenomena that cannot be described as a simple linear succession : the desuetude of certain theories and particularly the temporary desuetude of the theory of neuroplasticity. We argue that studying this theory reveals some of the inadequacies of (...) the linear conception of the history of science. (shrink)

Engaging in a chronological retrospection of my professional and personal transdisciplinary practice of walking-based research over the past decade, and embedding some elements of arts-based writin...

L’histoire des sciences est souvent comprise comme une succession de théories, les nouvelles supplantant les anciennes. Or cette conception de l’histoire des sciences ne rend pas justice à la complexité des dynamiques à l’œuvre dans le développement scientifique. Pour illustrer cela, nous nous intéressons à un type de phénomènes qui ne peut pas être décrit comme relevant d’une simple succession linéaire : la désuétude de certaines théories. Nous portons notre attention sur un cas particulier : la désuétude temporaire qui a (...) frappé la théorie de la neuroplasticité. Nous défendons l’idée que l’étude de cette théorie fait apparaître certaines des insuffisances de la conception linéaire de l’histoire des sciences. (shrink)

We agree with Cushman that rationalizations are the product of biological adaptations, but we disagree about their function. The data available do not show that rationalizations allow us to reason better and make better decisions. The data suggest instead that rationalizations serve reputation management goals, and that they affect our behaviors because we are held accountable by our peers.

Well-intended natural resource policies that ignore the complexity of socio-ecological systems too often threaten local values and opportunities for sustainable development. Upland areas throughout Indonesia provide examples of complex socio-ecological systems experiencing rapid socio-economic and environmental transformations in response to interactions between development policies and local agendas. Broad natural resource policies influence socio-ecological systems in different ways. In some cases, there are converging national and local goals, while in others the goals of national policy conflict with local aspirations. This study (...) identifies how broadscale policies could respond to the unique characteristics of upland areas to optimise development outcomes and avoid unintended risks for people and the landscape. The theory of reflexive modernity is utilised to illustrate how two national policies, the Community Forestry initiative and the Irrigation Reservoir program, largely discount the complexity of local values in the uplands of Pagar Alam, Indonesia. We identify local farmer aspirations through an analysis of development narratives and relate how they are impacted upon by the two policies. Our findings indicate that dominant development goals and associated sustainability pathways diverge in a range of ways from local farmer values and aspirations. We suggest that policymakers take more consideration of four interacting elements, namely: local ecological traits; local values and institutions; the multiple development pathways; and exogenous market drivers that affect local development, to promote sustainability and increase the likelihood of achieving all desired policy outcomes. (shrink)

This paper argues for a fundamental overhaul of the current competence constellation in the EU, which is necessary to address the problem that the current arrangement does not respect the important values that it is supposed to uphold, namely those of democracy, subsidiarity and national diversity. While pretending otherwise, it effectively contains neither negative nor positive EU integration in areas of Member State competence. Furthermore, it enables European integration of these areas through even less accountable intergovernmental mechanisms. It will be (...) argued that the root cause of this problem is that demarcation of competences as a method to contain the EU does not work, because such an approach of ‘categorical federalism’ is bound to fail, especially in the EU context since it is incompatible with the functionality that is written in the legal order’s DNA. It is therefore proposed to dispose of demarcation as a way to contain EU action and instead to openly recognise the inevitable broadness of the EU’s powers while containing the exercise of these powers through a democratisation of the legislative process. The paper tables a number of proposals that on the one hand enhance the EU’s formal legislative powers, while on the other hand strengthen national parliaments in their powers politically to review proposed EU legislation. (shrink)

The structure of this article is very simple. In the first half, I will introduce a sophisticated way of reading Heidegger as a relativist; I draw here on the work of Kusch and Lafont. In the second half, I present the counter-argument. As I see it, Heidegger is not a relativist; but understanding the relations between his approach and a relativistic one is crucial for an evaluation of both his own work and the broader trajectory of post-Kantian thought.

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas . van Fraassen, one of the world’s foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, (...) and secondly in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion. Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy. (shrink)

This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? My aim is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. I first disambiguate various nonequivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: I then look closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of (...) intentionality. I argue ultimately that, given the relevant disambiguations, the answers to all three questions will likely be positive. These results both support what has become known as the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, and make clearer the price the conceptualist must pay to sustain her position. (shrink)

'The Laws of Evolution' questions our current understanding of the laws that govern our universe and its evolution.

Early childhood education and care settings in England and the people who work in them constitute an important sphere of influence, shaping young children's characters and values. But the values and dispositions expected of the early years workforce are missing from statutory policy documentation despite its clear requirement that practitioners will espouse and promote particular 'universal' values in their work. The expectations for young children's achievement by the age of five also reveal a complex approach combining a structuralist and postmodern (...) duality of individualistic and collectivist values. These present challenges and dilemmas for the sector. (shrink)

One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this article, I argue that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, I discuss in detail how and why my reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. I suggest ultimately that it is only by (...) embracing nonconceptualism that we can fully recognise the delicate calibration of the trap which the Critique sets for Hume. (shrink)

Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...) questions. First, how does Heidegger’s Kant understand the concept of the transcendental? Second, what role does the concept of a horizon play in Heidegger’s reconstruction of the Critique? I answer the first question by drawing on Cassam’s model of a self-directed transcendental argument, and the second by examining the relationship between Kant’s doctrine that ‘pure, general logic’ abstracts from all semantic content and Hume’s attack on metaphysics. I close by sketching the implications of my results for Heidegger’s own thought. Ultimately, I conclude that Heidegger’s commentary on the Critical system is defined, above all, by a single issue: the nature of the ‘form’ of intentionality. (shrink)

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the world’s foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, (...) and second in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion._ _Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy. (shrink)

The debate on the ethics of involuntary treatment for Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is dominated by biomedical ethics approaches to the issues. In keeping with the biomedical ethics emphasis on objectively balancing ethical principles, the debate centres on how to respect the autonomy of persons with AN who refuse treatment whilst protecting these persons from harm. Commentators discuss this at a normative ethics level. Thus, the debate does not address the moral relevance of how knowledge is constructed in the practice environment (...) and the impact this has on how professional values are applied during treatment decision making. Social work ethics highlights the need for professionals to account for the authority of professional knowledge and for patients to participate in treatment decisions. However, in the practice environment, questioning medical hegemony and supporting patient participation, empowerment and self-determination (core social work values) is complicated by a lack of treatment efficacy, the high level of risk that patients present to themselves and uncertainty around the autonomy and competence of the patient to refuse treatment. This paper argues that postmodern ethics can support practitioners in managing these issues. In doing so, this paper makes a social work contribution to the debate. (shrink)

In 1820, J. Pelletier and J.-B. Caventou, two French pharmacist-chemists working at the Ecole de Pharmacie of Paris, extracted quinine, a new substance, from cinchona bark. We use this example to illustrate the processes which lead from a crude natural product through the isolation of an active principle to the production of a pure manufactured drug. This allows us to discuss the development of chemical analysis in relation to pharmacy, natural history, medicine and the early pharmaceutical industry. The dynamics of (...) the disciplines involved here show how organic chemistry, which was developing rapidly during these crucial years, expanded and became autonomous. Theoretical aspects and practical innovations are relevant to the scientific methods developed by the first generation of those who integrated the new chemistry into their daily work. Beyond these historical issues, this paper aims to show how a holistic approach can contribute to the debate on discovery and invention in a science that is often considered empirical. (shrink)

Science des poisons, la toxicologie est une spécialité pluridisciplinaire dont l’enseignement est dispersé entre médecine, pharmacie et chimie. Les manuels de toxicologie soulèvent des enjeux disciplinaires et éditoriaux. Une première partie montre, à travers une approche sérielle et comparative, comment la publication de manuels constitue un moyen de promouvoir et de revendiquer la reconnaissance institutionnelle d’une discipline aux contours fluctuants. Une deuxième partie présente l’histoire éditoriale du Manuel complet de médecine légale de Briand & Chaudé et les conséquences disciplinaires de (...) l’insertion d’un Traité élémentaire de chimie légale écrit par des pharmaciens-chimistes. (shrink)

Science des poisons, la toxicologie est une spécialité pluridisciplinaire dont l’enseignement est dispersé entre médecine, pharmacie et chimie. Les manuels de toxicologie soulèvent des enjeux disciplinaires et éditoriaux. Une première partie montre, à travers une approche sérielle et comparative, comment la publication de manuels constitue un moyen de promouvoir et de revendiquer la reconnaissance institutionnelle d’une discipline aux contours fluctuants. Une deuxième partie présente l’histoire éditoriale du Manuel complet de médecine légale (10 éditions : 1821-1880) de Briand & Chaudé et (...) les conséquences disciplinaires de l’insertion d’un Traité élémentaire de chimie légale écrit par des pharmaciens-chimistes. (shrink)

This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's views (...) on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant's position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant's argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell's response to Bradley's regress; I focus in particular on the concept of ‘unity’. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant's account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps. (shrink)

This article examines the phenomenon of thought insertion, one of the most extreme disruptions to the standard mechanisms for self-knowledge, in the context of Kant's philosophy of mind. This juxtaposition is of interest for two reasons, aside from Kant's foundational significance for any modern work on the self. First, thought insertion presents a challenge to Kant's approach. For example, the first Critique famously held that " The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations " (Kant, KrV, B132). (...) Yet thought insertion raises the problem of representations which are 'mine' by many natural criteria, and yet which I am unwilling to self-ascribe. Ultimately, my argument will be that thought insertion simultaneously problematises, and yet to some degree also vindicates, the complex distinctions between activity and passivity which underlie Kant's system. Second, I argue that Kant's position contains resources that allow us to model thought insertion, and its broader implications for self-knowledge, in an interesting and distinctive manner. Kant himself held an extreme view of philosophy's competence in the study of mental disorder: in the Anthropology, he suggests that courts must refer such cases to philosophers, rather than medics (Kant, Anth, p.214). My aim is much more modest: to suggest that a Kantian treatment of thought insertion deserves consideration by both philosophers and clinicians. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse à l’évolution récente d’une thématique particulière des nanosciences et nanotechnologies, les nanomachines moléculaires, au prisme d’un événement singulier dont la préparation a mobilisé les efforts des chercheurs avec une intensité particulière : la première course internationale de nanovoitures en avril 2017. Il retrace la genèse de ces objets, explique les motifs de l’organisation de la course, en raconte quelques épisodes et s’interroge sur la signification de cet événement : a-t-on affaire à un processus de gamification d’une technoscience (...) en mal de légitimité socioéconomique et de pertinence scientifique? Il montre qu’autre chose est en jeu, qui n’exclut pas la production de connaissances mais l’inscrit dans une nouvelle manière – technophanique – de réaliser des expériences. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse à l’évolution récente d’une thématique particulière des nanosciences et nanotechnologies, les nanomachines moléculaires, au prisme d’un événement singulier dont la préparation a mobilisé les efforts des chercheurs avec une intensité particulière : la première course internationale de nanovoitures en avril 2017. Il retrace la genèse de ces objets, explique les motifs de l’organisation de la course, en raconte quelques épisodes et s’interroge sur la signification de cet événement : a-t-on affaire à un processus de gamification d’une technoscience (...) en mal de légitimité socioéconomique et de pertinence scientifique? Il montre qu’autre chose est en jeu, qui n’exclut pas la production de connaissances mais l’inscrit dans une nouvelle manière – technophanique – de réaliser des expériences. (shrink)

This essay argues that there are theoretical benefits to keeping distinct—more pervasively than the literature has done so far—the psychological states of imagining that p versus believing that in-the-story p, when it comes to cognition of fiction and other forms of narrative. Positing both in the minds of a story’s audience helps explain the full range of reactions characteristic of story consumption. This distinction also has interesting conceptual and explanatory dimensions that haven’t been carefully observed, and the two mental state (...) types make distinct contributions to generating emotional responses to stories. Finally, the differences between the mental states illuminate how a given story can be both shared with others and at the same time experienced as personal. (shrink)